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1 Introduction
This study is unique due to:
• its extent - the number of sources (and its varieties) and recommendations
- compare with other studies
• its time-span, i.e. period 1995-2004 covering the rise and fall of global as
well as Swedish stock market - compare with other studies!
• the large number of investors in Sweden relative to the population - com-
pare with US and other industrial countries
Section 2 presents the approach chosen, while Section 3 describes the data.
The results are presented in Section 4, while Section 5 concludes.
2 Hypotheses and Method
2.1 Hypotheses
Stock recommendations in printed media have been studied on many markets
and published during varying periods before. Such stock recommendations are
publicly available at the publication day, and the potential profitability from
acting on them is a test of the semi-strong form of market efficiency. Although
a few previous studies have found such recommendations to be valuable for
readers (e.g. Desai et al. (2000); Ghani and Thomas (1996)), the majority find
that they are of limited use to readers (e.g. Liang (1999); Mathur and Waheed
(1995); and Muradogˇlu and Yazici (2002)). It is therefore a largely accepted
statement among researchers that stock markets are semi-strong efficient, i.e. it
is impossible to earn abnormal returns by acting on publicly known information.
In Sweden too, such results have been found in Lide´n (2006) when studying ini-
tiated and changed recommendations. Our first hypothesis can therefore be
stated as:
Hypothesis 1:
Acting on stock recommendations in the printed media leads to a normal return
taking into account the return to a proper benchmark.
2.2 Construction of Reference Portfolios
What then constitutes a proper benchmark? In the search for this proper bench-
mark, we aim at finding a benchmark replicating the risk level in each recom-
mended stock at the publication day and, perhaps most importantly, mimics
the return to be expected from this stock. The underlying reason is the fol-
lowing. Let us assume that a newspaper tend to publish recommendations of
relatively risky stocks. Then, when compared with the market return, these
recommendations will probably seem very impressive. Financial theory, never-
theless, stipulates that investors taking on a higher degree of risk should also
be compensated with a higher degree of return for doing so. Hence, overperfor-
mance is then to be expected. By filtering out these potential style differences
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between newspapers, it will be possible to compare them and at the same time
answering the question: do newspapers in their stock recommendations success-
fully pick the real winners?
According to the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) the risk an investor
takes on in an individual investment consists of two components; systematic
and unsystematic risk. In this model, only systematic risk is compensated by
additional expected return. Systematic risk is measured by β, and measures
how correlated with the market an asset is.
The β-coefficient determines the return to be expected by this individual
investment above the risk free rate. Hence, we would expect a portfolio con-
structed of stocks with similar betas to the recommended stock to yield the
same return as the one on the recommended stock itself.
Commonly, newspapers use the market index as a benchmark for evaluating
their performance. This is misleading because, according to CAPM, it should
be possible to beat such a benchmark by recommending readers to buy stocks
with higher-than average systematic risk, i.e. stocks with higher β.
Instead of using the market index as a benchmark, our benchmark is a risk
replicating portfolio (RRP) for each recommended stock. This portfolio is found
by calculating the beta for all stocks listed at the market at the recommendation
date and then forming an equally-weighted portfolio of the 10 percent of stocks
(typically 15 to 30 stocks) having the closest beta to the recommended stock.
The outcome will be a portfolio with an expected return equal to that of the
recommended stock, and with less unsystematic risk due to diversification. This
benchmark should, on average, be a much better (and harder to beat) bench-
mark than the market index. We will also show further ahead in this paper why
we believe the RRP-benchmark to be superior to the market index.
When comparing the RRP-benchmark with the market-index benchmark,
we also expect buy recommendations on high beta stocks to be outperforming
the market index but not the RRPs, and buy recommendations on low beta
stocks to underperform the market index but performing in line with the RRPs.
The RRP for each individual recommendation was found using the following
approach:
1. The beta for the six months prior to the publication day to the market
was calculated for all stocks listed at the Stockholm stock exchange.1
2. We rank stocks on beta relative to the beta of the recommended stock.
3. An equally-weighted RRP is then formed on the ten percent of stocks
with the most similar betas (in absolute terms) to the sample stock. In
practice this means that stocks both having higher and lower betas will
be included in the portfolio.
4. The returns on the RRP are then tracked for τ months (up to a year after
publication).
We calculate the long-horizon returns on the RRPs by first compounding
the returns on the securities constituting the portfolio and then summing across
securities:
RBHrpt =
ns∑
i=1
[
∏s+τ
t=s (1 +Rit)]− 1
ns
, (1)
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where ns is the number of securities in the portfolio traded in month s. The
return to this portfolio would be the same as investing equal amounts (thereby
being an equally-weighted portfolio) in each of the securities which constitutes
the portfolio, i.e. be a passive investment in these firms. The unique approach
whereby we allow the RRP to change in composition at each date in time,
allows a more accurate correction for the potential risk level in the recommended
stocks.
2.3 Buy-and-hold Abnormal Return (BHAR)
Calculating the BHARs for each recommended stock i during the period T , we
use the procedure
BHARiT = RiT − E(Rit), (2)
where the period-T BHAR will be calculated for the month prior to the event
period (from day -22 to day -2), during the event period itsel (-1 to +1), as well
as quarterly up to a year post-event; RiT is the return on stock i for period
T ; and E(Rit) is the expected return for the same period. As a proxy for
the expected return we use either the return to the market index or the RRP.
By using these reference investments, Barber and Lyon (1997) have found that
the new-listing and rebalancing biases are successfully eliminated but not the
skewness bias.2 We will return to this issue further ahead.
2.3.1 Statistical tests
Mean BHARs (BHARs) of certain types of recommendations and from a certain
groups were calculated as a simple mean, i.e. stocks in that portfolio is equally
weighted. This way of calculating the BHAR is preferred since it, in practice,
means than an investor mimicking the recommendations would invest an equal
amount of money in each recommended stock as they are published. Also, to
take care of misspecified test statistics due to skewness bias which may arise
when a portfolio is used as a reference investment, we employ a bootstrapped
skewness-adjusted t-statistic recently used in Lyon et al. (1999). The trans-
formed skewness-adjusted test statistic that is employed in the bootstrapping
procedure was developed in Johnson (1978), and can be expressed as:
tsa =
√
n
(
S +
1
3
γˆS2 +
1
6n
γˆ
)
, (3)
where
S =
BHART
σ(BHART )
, and γˆ =
∑n
i=1
(
BHARiT −BHART
)3
nσ(BHART )3
.
In the above expressions, γˆ is an estimate of skewness, and BHARiT is
the T -period BHAR for observation i. Sutton (1993) argues that only the
bootstrapped version of this skewness-adjusted test statistic yields well-specified
test statistics. The bootstrapping procedure that we employ means that we draw
1,000 bootstrapped resamples from the sample, each having the size nb = n/2,
and for each resample we calculate the following test statistic:3
tbsa =
√
nb
(
Sb +
1
3
γˆbSb2 +
1
6n
γˆb
)
, (4)
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where
Sb =
BHAR
b
T
σb(BHART )
, and γˆb =
∑nb
i=1
(
BHARbiT −BHAR
b
T
)3
nbσb(BHART )3
.
The presented t-values in the tables to come are simply the average of the 1,000
resample t-values.
3 Data
3.1 Analysts and Journalists
In the result section, we discuss differences in the returns to recommendations
originating from analysts and journalists separately. This section will therefore
be devoted to describing how we define analysts and journalists.
We define an analyst as someone employed by a bank, a brokerage firm or
another employer having customers with an interest in the stock markets; and
a journalist as someone employed by a newspaper to write articles.
Analysts are normally asked by the respective newspaper to put together
recommendations. During our sample period, analysts from a total of 35 banks,
brokerage firms, or similar were giving stock recommendations in the newspa-
pers. Analysts give this kind of investment advice in the printed media with a
relatively high frequency. Why do highly compensated professionals engage in
such practices free of charge? That question is a reasonable one. We can think
of at least five reasons why they are willing to do that, reasons which may also
assist in explaining what we can expect from such recommendations.
First, the analyst employer have incomes based on transaction fees; an in-
creased trading volume consequently leads to an increased income. Recommen-
dations in the printed media will presumably lead to an increase in trading
volume and thereby an increase in analysts’ income.
Second, they may also have private clients who have recently taken, or are
about to take, positions in certain securities; hence a ’helping-hand’ phenomenon
may be a reason for analyst recommendations.
Third, they may also have, or be willing to get, the firm whose stock they rec-
ommend as a future client. The potential overoptimism analysts at investment
banks may have in such situations leading to positively biased recommenda-
tions, have been found in the overwhelming overoptimism literature (e.g. Dugar
and Nathan (1995); Dechow et al. (2000); Lin and McNichols (1998); Michaely
and Womack (1999); Bradshaw et al. (2003); Rajan and Servaes (1997); and
Hong and Kubik (2003)). The corporate finance deals are very lucrative for the
banks. Positive recommendations may increase their probability for winning
these deals. As an interesting detail, Ljungqvist et al. (2003) have found that
such analyst overoptimism did not increase the probability for winning future
corporate-finance deals.
Fourth, they may give overoptimistic recommendations since this have been
found to more often leading to a favorable job loss separation rather than being
accurate in their forecasts (e.g. Hong and Kubik (2003); and Boni and Womack
(2002)).
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Fifth, there may be a reputational aspect involved as well; analysts would
want to have a reputation as giving valuable and accurate recommendations
rather than the opposite.
All above the incentives available to analysts reveal the importance to dis-
tinguish between analyst and journalist in the performance evaluation of the
recommendations. Points two and three may lead to directly misleading recom-
mendations while point five should make analysts give leading recommendations.
None of the above incentives exist for journalists. It may, nevertheless, be
tempting for some of the journalists to use their informational advantage prior
to publishing a recommendation to buy or sell the stock they are about to give a
buy- or a sell recommendation.4 All newspapers today require of their employees
to report all their holdings and changes therein to the chief editor. There are
also rules prohibiting journalists from buying a stock which they intend to buy-
recommend until the article has been published. If they buy it after publication,
it must be held for no less than three months if the stock increases in price. If the
buy-recommended stock would fall they are, however, allowed to sell it before
the three-month period has passed. All mentioned restrictions are closely related
to the insider trading regulations in Sweden. Although this is the picture of how
journalists must act today, it has not always been the case. Another possibility
exist when a journalist may potentially earn from his/her relative informational
advantage. Let us assume that the journalist did research on a certain stock
and has prepared an article leading to a buy recommendation. He or she may
then deliberately decide not to publish the recommendation, but purchasing the
stock himself instead. Although journalists we have spoken to claim that this
is seldom the case, it may still occur. How often, nevertheless, remains an open
question.
There is yet another difference between the two groups; access to informa-
tion. Analysts have access to detailed information that will not be available
to journalists. They are also supported by a number of employees specialized
in processing detailed information in a standardized manner. The number of
man hours an analyst may put into analyzing a certain stock will obviously be
higher than for a journalist who often work on a recommendation alone. Fi-
nally, because banks work closely with some firms, they will also have access to
information and contacts with CEOs, CFOs, and other key employees which is
not usually the case for a journalist. This informational advantage of analysts
over journalists should enable them to come up with a more accurate valuation
of the stock and consequently more valuable recommendations.
With the presented differences in the incentives, information and thereby
possible behavior between the groups, we stress the importance to distinguish
between them in the analysis of the performance of their recommendations.
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
In total, there are 6,610 stock recommendations in the Swedish newspapers and
magazines during the period 1995-2004 consisting of 5,714 buy recommenda-
tions and 896 sell recommendations. Many of the recommendations concern
initial public offerings and recently listed stocks (listed less than six months
before publication). Since we are only interested in the value of the information
contained in the recommendations of already listed companies, these recommen-
dations are dropped. Recommendations on IPOs totals to 569 (8.6 percent of
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the initial sample), consisting of 524 buy recommendations (9.2 percent of the
initial sample of buy’s) and 45 sell recommendations (5.0 percent of the initial
sample of sell’s). When the recommendations on IPOs have been dropped from
our initial sample, the sample consists of 5,190 buy recommendations and 851
sell recommendations. Besides documenting whether it is a buy or a sell and
being from an analyst or journalist, we also gathered the following information
for each individual recommendation: the market size measured as the number
of outstanding shares multiplied by the share price; if there was an earnings
announcement the day before, at the day of, or the day after the publication;
the name of the columnist; and the employer of the columnist.
In table 1, the number of stock recommendations, and details such as: a
description of type of newspaper; whether analysts or journalists give recom-
mendations; circulation; number of issues; collaboration with other newspapers
in the sample; are presented divided by each separate newspaper.
A considerable amount of the given recommendations in newspapers comes
from analysts, i.e. about 27 percent of all recommendations. Analysts are very
active in giving buy recommendations and less active giving sell recommenda-
tions. This fits well with the common belief that analysts tend to market positive
information rather than negative. In general terms, buy recommendations are
six times as common as sell’s. While journalists have a tendency to quite often
give sell recommendations in relation to buy’s (the buy-to-sell ratio is about 5),
that is certainly not the case for analysts. On every sell recommendation given
by analysts, there are no less than 23 buy recommendations!
Again, speaking in general terms, Bo¨rsveckan and Dagens Industri gives rec-
ommendations of relatively small stocks whereasAftonbladet andGo¨teborgsposten
tend to recommend relatively large ones.
Table 2 present sample descriptives and distribution over years for recom-
mendations divided into those from analysts and journalists.
Over the years, analysts have given relatively steadily 20-40 percent of all buy
recommendations. Sell recommendations were common for analysts in relative
terms in the beginning of the period but after 1998, however, analysts simply
ceased with negative recommendations. The number of buy recommendations
from analysts peaked during 1998, while it did so during 2000 for journalists.
Although journalists had a somewhat bullish view in many stocks during the
bubble-period, i.e. 1998-2000, they also increased the number of sell recommen-
dations dramatically in 1999 and kept that level during 2000-2001 as well.
Now to the details about given recommendations. Analysts gave recommen-
dations of larger stocks than did journalists and the difference is statistically sig-
nificant, a difference coming from the relatively larger buy-recommended stocks
from analysts. The first-day market-adjusted returns to buy recommendations
display that the market believed more in journalist recommendations than in
those from analysts. The positive reaction to buy recommendations from jour-
nalists was twice the size of analysts, but the negative reaction to sell recommen-
dations was more than thirteen times larger. The raw one-year returns to buy
recommendations is relatively high, though the market-adjusted one-year re-
turns are just marginally above zero. The fact that buy recommendations from
journalists do better than those from analysts is due to journalists frequently
giving buy’s to stocks performing relatively well when the market generally do
poorly. When it comes to sell recommendations, those who followed analyst
recommendations would actually have lost more than eight percentage points
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in their investments. Journalist sell-recommended stocks were unchanged. The
market-adjusted one-year returns to sell recommendations from analysts per-
formed better than those from journalists; analysts tended to give sell recom-
mendations to stocks which performed worse than the market. These stocks
actually increased in price, but much less than the market generally did. This
can be understood by remembering that analysts gave most of their sell’s when
the market index increased (1995-98), whereas those from journalists were given
when markets fell.
We also put buy- and sell recommendations together. Calculating the first-
year market-adjusted returns, for example, we take the first-year market-adjusted
return to buy-recommended stocks minus the corresponding for sell-recommended
stocks. With this approach, we find journalist recommendations to perform
slightly better than those of analysts. The returns are very low when compared
to the return on the market.
Stock recommendations are regularly published based on information which
is released directly from the company in question. Released earnings announce-
ments, for example, may reveal new information leading to recommendations.
For this reason we consider a recommendation to be given due to an upcoming
or an already released earnings announcement if it was given during a period of
two days before to two days after the earnings announcement. For our sample,
this occurs in 235 instances (3.9 percent of the sample observations). As we
have previously mentioned, recommendations are regularly repeated. We study
returns up to a year after they were published. We define a repeated recom-
mendation as one of the same type (i.e. buy or sell) that is given within a year
of the previous without one with contradictory view given in between. With
this definition, as many as 4,883 of our sample recommendations (80.8 percent)
are repeated ones. For obvious reasons, earnings announcements is one source
to repeated recommendations. In 200 of the 235 earnings-announcements given
recommendations (85.1 percent), they were found to be repeated ones. This
finding also fits well with the fact that stocks of large firms are often repeated
and these stocks are also followed extremely well both by the printed media and
analysts.
4 Empirical Results
The results presented in this section follow certain restrictions. The RRPs
are formed on the stocks with the closest six-month beta-coefficient prior to
the recommendation date. In addition to these results we have also formed the
RRP based on 3-, 9- and 12-month betas. The results are, with minor variations,
essentially the same and are therefore not presented here. The results to these
calculations can be found in tables 11 and 12 of the Appendix. Furthermore, the
RRPs presented here are formed on the ten percent of stocks with the closest
beta coefficient to the recommended stock. We have also performed calculations
where the RRPs are formed on the 5 and 15 percent of stocks with the closest
beta to the recommended stock. This sensitivity check was performed only for
the six-month beta calculation. Again, this alternative approach dos not alter
the results and are therefore not presented her. They are nevertheless presented
in tables 13 and 14, also in the Appendix-section.
Let us first begin by commenting on the RRPs. When we form the RRP
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for each and every recommended stock, we have saved the ticker-codes of the
stocks that are to be included. This is important in order to enable an anal-
ysis of what kind of stocks will be included relative to the one recommended.
A common approach in similar studies would be to present industry-adjusted
returns. Industry-adjusted returns means using a sector index rather than the
market index as a benchmark to each recommendation. This is appealing since
stocks in the same sector tend to be facing similar risks. But it is also possible
that stocks in other sectors could be facing the same risks. Furthermore, assume
that a stock which is heavily weighted in a certain sector index receives a rec-
ommendation. Using the sector-index return as a benchmark would essentially
mean comparing the return to the recommended stock with an index containing
a large part of the return to that stock. This is a bad order. Our approach guar-
antees that the recommended stock will never be allowed to be included in the
RRP. Also, when we analyze the stocks that are included in the RRP, we see an
interesting pattern. A large majority of the included stocks actually come from
the same sector industry. But far from all. The outcome will be that the RRP
will include the stocks in the same sector index which explain the movements in
the stock price but also stocks from other sectors explaining these movements.
Finally, Stockholm stock exchange is a relatively small stock market. Using an
industry-adjusted approach would become extremely sensitive to the return to
a few stocks and thereby leading to incorrect results.
The buy-and-hold abnormal returns to buy recommendations are presented
in table 3
[Insert table 3 about here]
In the table, we present the BHARs, not only for the RRP as a benchmark,
but also for the market index. The reason for doing so is twofold. First, most
studies present market-adjusted returns. Second, we take this opportunity to
show how different the outcome of the results turn out to be depending on the
choice of benchmark. If nothing else is said, we will focus on the RRP-adjusted
returns.
The buy-recommended stocks are of stocks that did perform well during
the month prior to being recommended in the newspapers. The reaction to
these recommendations around, and at, the publication day is positive and
statistically strong. For the first few months, there seem to be some indication
that the information contained in the recommendations makes investors to value
these stocks higher than they did at the publication. Over longer periods (9-12
months) this slight advantage over their peers is reversed to a disadvantage.
One year after the buy recommendations were published, they have decreased
by two percentage points on average relative to their peers. These figures are,
nevertheless, statistically insignificant.
At this point, there are two issues that should briefly be discussed. First,
when compared with the market index the buy recommendations seem impres-
sive. They actually significantly outperform the market index on average by
almost four percentage points for a year after publication. Obviously, measuring
the buy-and-hold abnormal returns in this manner would lead to a completely
false conclusion. Newspapers tend to give buy recommendations of relatively
risky stocks. Taking into account that buy recommended stocks are riskier than
the average stock leads to less an impressive performance. Second, we earlier
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stressed the importance of using the bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistic.
Using the ordinary t-statistic would lead to stronger-than realistic statistical
significance. For example, the 12-month t-stat figure for buy recommendations
would become statistically significant at the ten percent level instead of statisti-
cally insignificant at conventional levels using the skewness-adjusted t-statistic.
Table 3 also present returns to buy recommendations divided into those from
analysts and journalists separately. Both analysts and journalists tend to give
buy recommendations of stocks that have performed well during the month prior
to the publication day. At the publication day itself, the reaction in the stock
price to buy recommendations from journalists is much stronger than it is to
stocks that are buy recommended by analysts. In fact, the reaction to buy rec-
ommendations from journalists is more than twice the magnitude of the reaction
to analyst buy recommendations. When it comes to the post-publication re-
turns, both analyst and journalist recommendations underperform other stocks
with similar riskiness. However, during the first three months, stocks being
recommended by analysts increase by more than one percentage point. One
year after the recommendations were published, those from journalists under-
performed by more than one percentage point whereas analyst recommendations
underperformed by almost three percentage points.
The BHARs to sell recommendations are shown in table 4.
[Insert table 4 about here]
The stocks which are given a sell recommendation have increased in price relative
to other stocks with the same riskiness during the month prior to the publica-
tion. The reaction to sell recommendations at the publication day is nevertheless
strong and negative. These stocks decrease by two percentage points at the pub-
lication day. During the coming few months, these stocks continue to decrease;
after a year they have decreased by more than ten percentage points relative
to the RRP. Dividing sell recommendations from analysts and journalists, there
are a few points to mention. First, sell recommendations from analysts are very
seldom. Second, analysts tend to give sell recommendations to stocks that have
performed poorly during the previous month whereas journalists prefer to give
sell to stocks that have performed relatively well during the same period. The
reaction to sell recommendations from journalists is much stronger than it is to
sell recommendations from analysts; almost 20 times larger. Nevertheless, both
analysts and journalists succeed in finding the loosers.
That sell recommended stocks decrease relative to other equally risky stocks
does not reveal the potential profitability from acting on them. In order to profit
from sell recommendations there are two prerequisites that has to be met: (1)
the stocks receiving a sell recommendation has to decrease in price, and (2) it
has to be possible to short the stock.
As for the first prerequisite, stocks that receive a sell recommendation sur-
prisingly increase in price by two percentage points during the first year after
the publication. So even if the second prerequisite was met, it would not be
profitable to trade on the information in sell recommendations. Doing so would
lead to a financial loss. The reason that sell recommendations seem very im-
pressive is because other stocks increased by much more and thereby making
sell-recommended stocks underperformers. As for the second prerequisite, most
stocks on Stockholm stock exchange are not shortable. Therefore, sell recom-
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mendations are only to any use for current shareholders who may use them to
sell these stocks and buy other stocks with the same riskiness.
4.1 Robustness
In the previous section, we found buy recommendations not to fully compensate
investors for the risk they took on when following them. Although investors were
not fully compensated, the results were not as weak as to say that they were
misleading investors. Furthermore, sell recommendations successfully pinned
down underperforming stocks. To profit from this underperformance would
not be possible since the price of these stocks increased in value a year after
they were published. In addition to these main findings we also stressed the
importance of the t-statistic and - perhaps most importantly - the benchmark
one uses when analyzing the post publication performance.
This section will discuss how these results hold over different groups and
how other circumstances affect the performance of the recommendations, with
an emphasis on the buy recommendations.
4.1.1 Individual newspapers
Even though buy recommendations have shown a weak performance for those
who based their investment decisions upon them, there may still be individual
newspapers who publish winning recommendations. We will discuss whether
that is the case here as well as other issues.
The BHARs to buy- and sell recommendations in individual newspapers are
shown in tables 5 and 6.
[Insert tables 5 and 6 about here]
There are several aspects of the buy recommendations from individual news-
papers worth mentioning.
All newspapers give buy recommendations of stocks that increased in value
prior to the publication day. Especially Bo¨rsinsikt and Bo¨rsveckan gave buy
recommendations of stocks that had a healthy stock-price development before
being recommended. There is a positive reaction to these recommendations at
the day when the recommendations are published in the respective newspaper.
For Aktiespararen and Privata Affa¨rer this reaction is, however, statistically
insignificant. The largest reaction to the published buy recommendations was
found for Bo¨rsveckan and Dagens Industri. For Dagens Industri it was close
to five percentage points. There may be two potential factors explaining this
sizeable positive reaction in the stock price at the publication day. It could either
be that the recommendations reveal information that was unknown to the stock
market prior to the publication day or that the stock-market participants had a
strong believe that a buy recommendation in Dagens Industri would lead to an
increased stock price. When observing the post-recommendation performance
to these recommendations it is evident that the latter explanation seems the
more appealing. There was no information revealed in these recommendations
that made the stock market reevaluate the price of these stocks, i.e. the reaction
on the publication day was seemingly an overreaction.
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During the post-recommendation period the buy recommendations from
most newspapers underperform their benchmark. In all instances but for Afton-
bladet this is insignificantly so. Those who followed the buy recommendations
from that newspaper would have been compensated with a return of −15.72
percent (with a t-value of −3.04). The return to buy’s from Expressen was even
worse in economic terms, −17.22 percent, but statistically insignificant. So the
two tabloids present by far the worst buy recommendations.
No newspaper present buy recommendations that would have been profitable
to follow although those who followed buy recommendations from Bo¨rsveckan
would have earned a substantial return.
If we look at the sell recommendations in table 6 we see that there was
a strong negative reaction at the publication day to sell recommendations in
all newspapers. Again, the strongest reaction was to the recommendations
in Dagens Industri but as for buy recommendations in that newspaper, stock
prices bounces back. For buy recommended stocks it seemed to be due to an
overreaction, but here it is because a single recommendation went all wrong.
On January 25 1999 Dagens Industri recommended their readers to sell off
their stocks in Icon Medialab. During the coming year, however, the share
price rocketed by no less than 985 percent. They would, however, turn out
to be correct in their judgement in the longer run. After two years from the
publication day of the recommendation the price had decreased by 42 percent.
So, the sell-recommended stocks has a negative price reaction at the publi-
cation day followed by further decreasing prices. Even that this is the case, only
the sell recommendations from Aftonbladet would have been profitable to act
on over the first post-publication year. In contrast with the stocks being given
a sell recommendation in other newspapers, these also experience a decrease in
absolute value. More than half of these stocks decrease in value and on average
they decrease with 14 percentage points. If it would be possible to short these
stocks in practice, an investor could earn a handsome return from acting on
them.
To conclude: buy recommendations show a bad post-publication perfor-
mance and the worst ones can be found in Aftonbladet ; and sell recommenda-
tions show a good performance and the best ones can also be found in Afton-
bladet.
Taking away Aftonbladet in the analysis would lead to an improvement in
the performance of buy’s and a worse performance of sell’s. Buy recommen-
dations would still trail the risk replicating portfolio by almost one percentage
point whereas the underperformance of sell recommended stocks would shrink
to roughly four percentage points.
4.1.2 Individual columnists
Are there any individual columnists who underperform or overperform the RRP?
The BHARs to recommendations from successful and unsuccessful columnists
are displayed in table 7.
[Insert table 7 about here]
Let us begin by discussing the successful columnists, i.e. columnists 1 through
3. In order to find the successful and unsuccessful columnists we gathered and
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analyzed columnists giving at least 30 buy recommendations during the sample
period. To be honest, very few of the 208 columnists give more than 30 buy rec-
ommendations. It is a common scenario that the most unsuccessful columnists
can be found among those who give only a few recommendations.
Columnist 1 was the one giving most buy’s in our sample; 317 in total. One
year after the buy recommendations from this columnist were given, they had
gained over 13 percent relative stocks with equal riskiness. With much less
number of recommendations, the buy’s from columnist 2 (41 recommendations)
and columnist 3 (30 recommendations) lead to BHARs of 21 and 34 percent a
year after being published.
There are, obviously, individual columnists who succeed in giving buy rec-
ommendations who beat the the appropriate benchmark. But as we can see
from the recommendations from columnists 4 through 8, the opposite is also
true.
This sad group of five individual columnists really underperform the bench-
mark by far. The underperformance a year after being published ranges from
8 to 37 percent. One can also see that the market does not react to these rec-
ommendations significantly positively at the publication day, contrary to buy
recommendations in general.
If we were to drop the buy recommendations from the successful columnists,
the one-year BHARs would decrease to −3.31 percent (with a t-value of −2.29).
If we would also drop the underperforming columnists, the same figure would
be −2.33 percent (with a t-value of −1.56).
4.1.3 Unique and repeated recommendations
It is often the case that recommendations are repeated; more often rule than
exception. In order to get a picture of which recommendations are repeated and
which ones are not, we reasoned in the following way. If a stock is given a buy
recommendation in one newspaper and in less than one year is given another
buy in the same or another newspaper without a sell in between, the second buy
is considered a repeated one. For a series of buy recommendations of the same
stock without a sell recommendation in between and less than a year between
each of them, all but the first one is considered repeated.
There are two reasons why this is important. First, subsequent recommen-
dations are given with the recent ones in mind. But our approach assumes that
recommendations are independent. We have chosen one year between the same
recommendation for defining which recommendations are repeated ones and
which are not; this is the horizon on which we analyze the BHARs. Therefore,
if the distance between two recommendations without a sell in between, they
should be independent from each other. Based on these simple criteria about
86 percent (4,455 out of 5,190) of all buy recommendations were repeated ones.
The BHARs to unique and repeated buy recommendations are shown in ta-
ble 8.
[Insert table 8 about here]
We can see that unique buy recommendations are of stocks that increased
much prior to being recommended, much more than repeated buy-recommended
stocks. The unique recommendations also experience a much stronger reaction
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at in the days surrounding the publication as well as the publication day it-
self. The reaction at the publication day was more than three times the size
for unique recommendations relative to repeated ones. Unique buy recommen-
dations beat the risk-replicating portfolio by almost 7 percent a year after it
was given. Repeated buy recommendations, on the other hand, lost to the risk-
replicating portfolio by more than 3 percent. The 10-percent difference between
the two is statistically significant. The 10-percent difference between unique and
repeated buy recommendations from journalists is also statistically significant
but not the same difference between analyst’s recommendations.
Analysts give 8 repeated recommendation for every new recommendation
whereas the same relationship is 5.5 for journalists. This is actually not so
surprising. In their daily work, the most important clients for analysts are
institutional investors, i.e. mutual funds and insurance companies. These clients
are not interested in smaller companies because of the rules they must follow.
Consequently they are more interested in investing in larger firms. Therefore
analysts aim at analyzing larger firms. Also, repeated recommendations are
naturally more common in larger firms because more journalists and analysts
follow them than smaller firms.
4.1.4 Earnings announcements
Stock recommendations are often given in connection to recent earnings an-
nouncements. We define a recommendation to be driven or influenced by an
earnings announcement if it was given at the day before, at the same day, or
the day after the announcement. In our sample period about 4 percent (207 of
5,190 recommendations) of all buy recommendations were driven by an earnings
announcement.
The BHARs to buy recommendations driven by positive earnings announce-
ments are shown in table 8.
As we can see, the one-year post-publication BHAR to buy recommendations
driven by an earnings announcement is positive, but insignificantly so.
4.1.5 Years
The BHARs to buy recommendations over year of recommendation are shown
in table 9.
[Insert table 9 about here]
We can see that during some years buy recommendations did better (1996,
1997, 2000 and 2001), and during some years worse (1999 and 2003). The many
recommendations during 1999 did exceptionally much worse than during any
other individual year. Excluding these recommendations from the analysis, the
buy recommendations from the other years did actually beat the RRP by 3.76
percent.
4.1.6 Firm size
We also divided buy recommendations into different groups based on market
capitalization of the recommended firm. We classified firms as either ’small’,
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’medium’ or ’large’. As of July 1, a small firm at the Stockholm stock exchange
is defined as one with a market capitalization less than 150 million euro, a
medium-sized firm as one between 150 and 1,000 million euro, and a large firm
is one with a market capitalization above 1,000 million euro. We then converted
these figures to Swedish kronor (SEK). A large firm on July 1 would then be a
firm larger than 9,224 million SEK. For the sake of dividing firms into different
size categories, we adjusted the market capitalization for the stock-market de-
velopment for earlier periods. Using that approach a large firm in the beginning
of 1995 was a firm with a market capitalization above 2,602 million SEK.
The BHARs to buy recommendations over different size groups are shown
in table 10.
[Insert table 10 about here]
Buy recommendations are fairly evenly distributed between small (31 percent),
medium (32) and large (37) firms. Buy recommendations of small-firm stocks
perform much better than the RRP, whereas recommendations of medium-
and large-sized stocks underperform the same benchmark. A year after these
buy recommendations were published they outperformed those of medium-sized
stocks by more than 8 percentage points and large-sized stocks by more than
12 percentage points. Journalists succeed in finding the winners among small
firms whereas analysts fail totally with medium-sized firms and both analysts
and journalists fail with large-sized firms.
4.1.7 Outliers
In every sample outliers will exist. To what extent does outliers here affect
or change or findings? Recommendations with extreme abnormal returns are a
part of reality. But these extreme occasions may be an outcome of an individual
newspaper or columnist being pure lucky or unlucky. So when we draw our
conclusions concerning the potential value of the recommendations for a reader,
these may be depending heavily on a few observations. By filtering out these
most extreme observations, we may draw more reliable conclusions, free from
lucky or unlucky recommendations.
5 Summary and Conclusions
T.B.W.
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Table 3: BHARs in percentage to buy recommendations before, at and after the
publication. The buy-and-hold abnormal returns are presented using two reference-portfolio
measures as the expected return: (1) the simple market portfolio (M) here characterized by the
SIX return index; and (2) a risk replicating portfolio (RRP). The RRP is a reference invest-
ment, or a portfolio, for each individual stock recommendation consisting of the ten percent
of all listed stocks with the closest beta-coefficient (in absolute terms) to the recommended
stock. The beta-coefficient is calculated for the six-month period prior to the publication
day. The t-stats reported are the bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-stats. The transformed
skewness-adjusted test statistic that is employed here was developed in Johnson (1978), and
can be expressed as: tbsa =
√
nb
`
Sb + 1
3
γˆbSb2 + 1
6n
γˆb
´
; where both Sb and γˆb comes from
the bootstrapping procedure. The bootstrapping procedure means that we draw 1,000 boot-
strapped resamples from the sample, each having the size nb = n/2. For each resample we
calculate the above test statistic. The presented t-values in the tables to come are simply the
average of the 1,000 resample t-values. * = significant at the 10-percent level, ** = significant
at the 5-percent level, and *** = significant at the 1-percent level using a two-tailed t-test.
Buy recommendations
All Analysts Journalists
(N=5,190) (N=1,582) (N=3,608)
Period M RRP M RRP M RRP
Pre [−21;−1] 2.90 2.36 3.42 2.96 2.68 2.10
(7.22∗∗∗) (5.40∗∗∗) (7.94∗∗∗) (6.56∗∗∗) (4.42∗∗∗) (3.11∗∗∗)
Event [−1; 1] 2.04 1.88 1.51 1.26 2.27 2.15
(18.94∗∗∗) (16.73∗∗∗) (7.41∗∗∗) (5.62∗∗∗) (15.82∗∗∗) (14.54∗∗∗)
PD 1.48 1.41 0.82 0.75 1.77 1.71
(16.00∗∗∗) (14.59∗∗∗) (5.30∗∗∗) (4.39∗∗∗) (14.34∗∗∗) (13.61∗∗∗)
3m [1; 63] 1.47 0.78 0.74 1.23 1.79 0.59
(2.87∗∗∗) (1.43) (0.99) (1.52) (2.76∗∗∗) (0.81)
6m [1; 126] 1.93 0.37 -0.15 0.46 2.84 0.32
(2.51∗∗) (0.38) (-0.18) (0.38) (2.91∗∗∗) (0.29)
9m [1; 189] 2.43 -1.54 0.32 -1.27 3.35 -1.66
(2.34∗∗) (-1.33) (0.20) (-0.77) (2.76∗∗∗) (-1.19)
12m [1; 252] 3.79 -1.85 1.93 -2.88 4.60 -1.40
(3.15∗∗∗) (-1.37) (0.88) (-1.18) (3.27∗∗∗) (-0.87)
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Table 4: BHARs in percentage to sell recommendations before, at and after the
publication. The buy-and-hold abnormal returns are presented using two reference-portfolio
measures as the expected return: the market portfolio (M); and a risk replicating portfolio
(RRP). The RRP is a reference investment, or a portfolio, for each individual stock recommen-
dation consisting of the ten percent of all listed stocks with the closest beta-coefficient (in ab-
solute terms) to the recommended stock. The beta-coefficient is calculated for the six-month
period prior to the publication day. The t-stats reported are the bootstrapped skewness-
adjusted t-stats. The transformed skewness-adjusted test statistic that is employed here was
developed in Johnson (1978), and can be expressed as: tbsa =
√
nb
`
Sb + 1
3
γˆbSb2 + 1
6n
γˆb
´
;
where both Sb and γˆb comes from the bootstrapping procedure. The bootstrapping proce-
dure means that we draw 1,000 bootstrapped resamples from the sample, each having the size
nb = n/2. For each resample we calculate the above test statistic. The presented t-values
in the tables to come are simply the average of the 1,000 resample t-values. * = significant
at the 10-percent level, ** = significant at the 5-percent level, and *** = significant at the
1-percent level using a two-tailed t-test.
Sell recommendations
All Analysts Journalists
(N=851) (N=71) (N=780)
Period M RRP M RRP M RRP
Pre [−21;−1] 1.63 1.14 -1.78 -1.66 1.94 1.40
(1.20) (0.92) (-0.94) (-0.95) (1.39) (1.02)
Event [−1; 1] -2.04 -2.13 0.39 0.60 -2.26 -2.37
(-3.32∗∗∗) (-3.57∗∗∗) (0.30) (0.60) (-3.49∗∗∗) (-3.53∗∗∗)
PD -2.11 -2.17 -0.21 -0.12 -2.28 -2.36
(-9.37∗∗∗) (-9.54∗∗∗) (-0.50) (-0.25) (-9.33∗∗∗) (-9.88∗∗∗)
3m [1; 63] -3.78 -4.35 -4.94 -2.36 -3.67 -4.53
(-2.25∗∗) (-2.60∗∗) (-1.87∗) (-0.83) (-1.95∗) (-2.51∗∗)
6m [1; 126] -6.03 -6.56 -6.28 -0.44 -6.01 -7.13
(-2.42∗∗) (-2.70∗∗∗) (-1.10) (-0.12) (-2.30∗∗) (-2.81∗∗∗)
9m [1; 189] -8.81 -10.99 -14.10 -15.27 -8.32 -10.60
(-2.76∗∗∗) (-3.72∗∗∗) (-2.14∗∗) (-2.07∗∗) (-2.51∗∗) (-3.35∗∗∗)
12m [1; 252] -7.90 -10.57 -19.04 -22.54 -6.87 -9.46
(-2.24∗∗) (-2.93∗∗∗) (-2.31∗∗) (-2.14∗∗) (-1.84∗) (-2.43∗∗)
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Notes
1Beta (β) is then calculated in the following way using six months of daily
data: β = [Cov(ri, r)]/[Std(r)]; where ri is the daily return to any stock (except
the one which is given a recommendation) and r is the return to the recom-
mended stock.
2The new listing bias arises because the reference portfolio usually contain
new firms; the rebalancing bias arises because the compounded return on the
reference portfolio are calculated assuming periodic rebalancing while returns
on the sample firms are compounded without rebalancing; and skewness bias
arises because the distribution of long-run abnormal stock returns is positively
skewed.
3It was found in Lyon et al. (1999) that a size of n/2 gives well-specified
inferences.
4This is very uncommon in Sweden, though there have been cases where
persons acting as journalists have acted in this way. For example, a columnist
working for Dagens Industri, was discovered to have been actively trading in
stocks while at the same time given recommendations in the newspaper to the
readers. When interviewed about it, he told media that he actively traded in
stocks since he wanted to author a book about daytrading and thereby wanted
to practice it before writing a book about it. Dagens Industri cleared him
from all suspicion since they found no obvious pattern in his trades with the
recommendations. He quit working as a columnist at Dagens Industri after this
incident but has since returned. He no longer make trades in stocks.
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Appendix
A Risk replicating portfolio abnormal returns
for varying beta-calculations
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